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Nasionalisme Etnik Semasa Indonesia Pasca Suharto: 
Persoalan Kaum Cina 
Abstrak 
 Kajian ini bertujuan mengenal pasti perkembangan sentimen etno-
nasionalisme, organisasi dan pergerakan yang dilakukan oleh golongan elit Cina di 
Indonesia semasa era pasca atau selepas Suharto dan pengaruh mereka terhadap 
politik Indonesia. Jika dibandingkan dengan kebanyakan kumpulan etno-nasionalis 
di Indonesia, nasionalis Cina dianggap unik kerana mereka merupakan pendatang 
atau imigran asal; komuniti Cina tidak mempunyai kesetiaan yang kuat terhadap 
Indonesia sebagai tanah air mereka.  Justeru, penulis ingin memastikan motivasi 
golongan elit Cina dalam menyatakan sentimen mereka terutamanya sentimen yang 
tidak wujud semasa regim Suharto. 
Kajian ini menggunakan kaedah penyelidikan kualitatif, khususnya 
pendekatan penyelidikan perpustakaan. Penyelidikan perpustakaan merupakan 
pilihan terbaik bagi kajian ini berdasarkan fakta bahawa ramai ahli komuniti Cina 
masih bimbang untuk membincangkan secara terbuka isu-isu yang berkaitan dengan 
politik. Justeru, soal selidik dan temu bual bukannya pilihan yang sesuai. Di samping 
itu, penulis juga  memperoleh maklumat daripada beberapa golongan elit etno-
nasionalis melalui temu bual secara peribadi. 
Dapatan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa agenda nasionalis Cina bukannya 
menuntut sesebuah wilayah. Motif  disebalik tindakan nasionalis Cina boleh diterima 
sebagai sebahagian daripada masyarakat Indonesia. Penulis mendapati bahawa 
xii 
nasionalis Cina semasa era pra-Suharto amat mempengaruhi nasionalis Cina dalam 
era pasca-Suharto. Semasa era Suharto, aktiviti berkaitan etno-nasionalisme 
dianggap sebagai aktiviti haram atau tidak sah. Oleh yang demikian, nasionalis Cina 
dalam era pasca-Suharto begitu diagung-agungkan oleh golongan elit Cina dalam era 
pra-Suharto. Di samping itu, nasionalis Cina tidak bersatu, mereka terbahagi kepada 
dua kumpulan yang berbeza. Kumpulan pertama, integrasionis Cina yang 
mengekalkan identiti mereka sebagai peranakan Cina tetapi menganggap Indonesia 
sebagai tanah air mereka.  Kumpulan kedua,  asimilasionis Cina yang menyatukan 
keseluruhan komuniti Cina dengan masyarakat Indonesia. Namun demikian, 
kemunculan generasi baru akan memberi kesan terhadap atitud peranakan  Cina buat 
selama-lamanya. Tambahan pula, terdapat peningkatan bilangan golongan Cina 
Indonesia yang terlibat dalam politik, sama ada melalui parti politik atau organisasi 
sosiobudaya. Malahan, mereka lebih selesa menyertai parti politik nasionalis yang 
dimiliki oleh Pribumi daripada parti politik berasaskan Cina. Hal ni kerana kaum 
Cina Indonesia tidak yakin dengan parti politik yang tidak berpengalaman dan tidak 
dikenali.  Yang mengejutkan, kebanyakan pengundi peranakan Cina dan Pribumi 
tidak mempedulikan bangsa dan agama seseorang calon bagi pilihanraya umum dan 
lokal, asalkan calon berkenaan berkarisma dan berpersonaliti yang baik. Akhir 
sekali, sentimen tidak puas hati yang terpendam terhadap kaum Cina Indonesia lebih 
terarah kepada isu sosioekonomi dan bukannya perasaan benci  yang wujud di antara 
kaum Cina Indonesia dan Pribumi.  
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Ethno-Nationalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Chinese 
Question 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to identify the development of ethno-nationalists’ 
sentiments, organizations and movements performed by the Chinese elites in 
Indonesia during post-Suharto era and their influence on Indonesian politics. If 
compared to most ethno-nationalist groups in Indonesia, Chinese nationalists are 
considered unique due to their origin as immigrants; Chinese community do not have 
strong ancestry attachment to Indonesia as their homeland. Therefore, the author 
wants to find out what motivates the Chinese elites to express their ethnic sentiment 
especially when such sentiments were not present during the Suharto regime. 
This study utilized qualitative research, specifically library research 
approach. Library research was the best option for this study due to the fact that 
many members of Chinese community were still anxious to discuss issues related to 
politics openly, and thus questionnaires and interviews were not viable options. In 
addition, the author has also obtained information from several ethno-nationalists 
elites through personal interviews. 
The result of this study revealed that Chinese nationalists’ agenda is not 
independence or claiming a region. The motive behind Chinese nationalists’ action is 
to be accepted as an integral part of the Indonesian society. The author discovered 
that the Chinese nationalists in pre-Suharto era heavily influenced the Chinese 
nationalists in the post-Suharto era. In Suharto era, activities related to ethno-
nationalism were considered as illegal. Therefore, Chinese nationalists in post-
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Suharto era have the tendency to glorify the accomplishment by the Chinese elites in 
the pre-Suharto era. Additionally, Chinese nationalists are not united, they are 
divided into two different groups; the Chinese integrationists who desire to maintain 
their identity as Chinese descents but still consider Indonesia as their homeland and 
Chinese assimilationists who desire to fully assimilate the entire Chinese community 
with the Indonesian society. Nevertheless, the emergence of reform generation (a 
newer generation which is more resilient with psychological trauma) will affect the 
Chinese descents’ attitude forever. Moreover, there are increasing numbers of 
Chinese Indonesians who participate in politics, either through political parties or 
socio-cultural organizations. Chinese descents prefer to join with nationalist political 
parties belong to Pribumi instead of Chinese-based political parties. This is because 
Chinese Indonesians are unsure with the capability of inexperience and unknown 
political parties. Surprisingly, most Chinese descents and Pribumi voters are not 
really concerned about ethnicity and the religion of the candidates for general and 
local elections as long as the candidate is charismatic and possess good personality. 
Lastly, latent discontent sentiment toward Chinese Indonesians is more to 
socioeconomic issues instead of deep-rooted hatred between Chinese Indonesians 
and Pribumi. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction  
1.1. Background of Study 
The emergence of ethno-nationalist movements has been linked to state 
disintegrations, authoritarian regimes ending, pseudo-democracy, and ethnic purges 
due to regime change (Wu, 2007). Wu‟s (2007) study on Taiwan revealed that the 
struggle for power by political elites actually provided the impetus for the use of 
ethno-nationalist movements. Moreover, Wu argued that political elites try to 
segregate, form, and harden ethnic-based communities in order to facilitate power 
access. Purewal‟s (1998) study on Sikh ethno-nationalist indicated that although the 
conflict between Sikh capitalist farmer and majorly Hindu bourgeoisie of India in 
Punjab boiled down to economic hegemony, it later on developed into an ethno-
nationalist struggle leading to violence by the military political elites, thus 
solidifying ethnic boundaries. 
 Furthermore, Lecours‟ (2001) study on ethno-nationalists‟ movements in 
Belgium, Spain and Canada showed that ethnic movements in these countries were 
orchestrated by elites although with different reasons. It started when the Flemish 
elites demanded for bilingualism in Belgium and it ended with many regions divided 
based on the dominant language. Additionally, during elections, the elites from both 
sides expose social injustice done by the other group to gain sympathy from voters. 
While in Spain, since 19
th
 century, Spanish elites attempted to establish centralized, 
liberal and modern state but they received heavy resistances from the elites of 
Basque and Galicia provinces who are more traditional and conservative. In 
addition, Castilian elites of Catalonia were afraid of this situation might threaten 
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their bourgeoisie power base joined Basque and Galicia. Therefore, these three 
regions established an alternate community for maintaining their supremacy. While 
in Canada, the conflict between French-speaking bourgeoisies with dominant 
English-speaking elites in Quebec region has made the establishment of identity 
based on language; identity formation in Canada was created based on competition 
between federal and provincial elites. 
1.1.1. The Evolution of Ethno-Nationalism Studies 
 The ethno-nationalism term was introduced by Connor (1994); he defined 
ethno-nationalism as the action made by a group that declares some degrees of 
autonomy on the fields that are unified by a unique sense of solidarity formed by 
one or more collective traits and then forms a nation, where the appearance of ethno-
nationalism is a nationalist movement (nationalist parties and organizations). The 
definition of ethno-nationalism for the Chinese Indonesian in this study based on the 
author‟s standpoint is an action performed by the Chinese nationalists who demand 
some degrees of autonomy on practicing their cultural identity and demand equality 
with other Indonesians. It is unified by a distinctive sense of solidarity that is shaped 
by one or more collective traits and fate, thus creates a community that is not only 
accepted by the Indonesians but also has equal status, whereas the materialization of 
the ethno-nationalism is a nationalist movement in a form of ethnic-based 
organizations. 
Ethno-nationalism is perceived in a very broad manner and might be 
substituted with nationalism due to the “loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state 
and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state” (Conversi, 2004, 
p.2). Moreover, political studies defines ethno-nationalism as the first and leading 
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form of politics as a product of particular interactions between political actors where 
symbolic and subjective dimension of ethno-nationalism make a unique political 
activity (Breuilly, 1982; Brass, 1991). 
Ethno-nationalism studies shows how ethno-cultural nationalism emerges 
and develops. However, a question arises: what is nationalism? Nationalism studies 
are a mushrooming subject that can dishearten scholars who study it due to its vague 
explanations of the key concepts. “To understand nationalism, we have to 
understand the practical uses of the category „nation‟, the way it can come to 
structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and 
political action” (Brubaker, 1996, p.10). If the scholars want to understand what is 
nation then they should see “nationhood as apolitical and cultural form 
institutionalized within and among states” (Brubaker, 1996, p.16). Renan (as cited in 
Eley & Suny, 1996) defined a nation as a big scale solidarity formed by the 
determination of the self-sacrifice desires that had been made in the past and by 
those who are willing to do it in the future. Renan‟s definition shares similarity with 
Anderson‟s (1991) concept. He defined nation as an “imagined community”, even in 
the smallest nation, its members will never know or even meet most of their fellow 
members, however, in their mind the communion image lives on and no matter how 
severe the inequality among them, a nation is always considered as a horizontal 
comradeship. 
 Nationalism study, in its development, is divided into two parts, civic 
nationalism and ethnic-cultural nationalism (also known as ethno-nationalism). An 
orthodox concept of nationalism assumed civic/territorial form as a good 
nationalism and ethnic/cultural form as a bad nationalism. Kohn (as cited in 
McCrone, 1998) argued superiority of western (civic) political form of nationalism 
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over eastern (ethnic) form can be seen from countries who adopt civic nationalism 
like England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and America. These nations 
basically are modern states where its people are defined as citizens and the concepts 
of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitan thrive. Contrary to the Eastern 
principle (suggestively Germany followed by Eastern Europe and Asia) which is 
completely the opposite of the civic countries, a nationalism is defined as a menace 
toward state borders and it can also easily change/shift due to ethnic demand, where 
its people are entitled as “folks” instead of citizens which is considered as primitive, 
traditional, lack of self-assurance, and inferior which was rewarded for “by over-
emphasis and over-confidence.”. (ibid., 7-8)  
However, Herzfeld (1992) challenged Kohn‟s testimony by arguing that 
modern administratively regulated society is no more logical or less symbolic than 
traditional society. In practice, a bureaucracy relies severely on symbols and moral 
boundaries in a form of language. Additionally, Smith (1988) argued myths, 
symbols and cultural practices are the keys for making a modern nation. Moreover, 
Smith claimed that modern nation superiority was extravagant; modernist failed to 
locate nation in a cultural shaping historical structure and forget if a nation has 
ethnic as its core. Brown (2000) stated that ethnic minorities decide to resort their 
trust in ethnicity because they assume civic nationalism impotence that led to them 
being marginalized and exploited; for those who are unwilling to resort to the ethno-
nationalism principle often choose multiculturalism as an alternative answer. 
1.1.2. Defining Ethnic Group and Ethnicity 
Ethnic groups can be defined in three different ways, in terms of objective 
attributes, with reference to subjective feelings, and in relation to behavior. The 
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objective attribute assumes that no particular attribute is regularly associated with all 
ethnic groups but there is always (a) unique cultural feature(s) that clearly 
differentiates one group with another. The cultural feature(s) might be in (a) form(s) 
of language, territory, religion, color, diet, dress, or combination of these. However, 
the main issue with the objective definition is very difficult to determine boundaries 
of the ethnic classifications. Although it is possible to do so, Barth (1969 as cited 
from Brass, 1991, pp.36) argued “the use of cultural attributes to identify ethnic 
boundaries may be superficial, confusing form with content.”  
In contrast, the subjective feeling definition faces difficulty when it has to 
explain a fundamental question, how a group of people attains subjective self-
consciousness in the beginning. Meanwhile, behavioral definition assumes that there 
are particular and concrete ways in which ethnic groups should or should not 
behave, especially when this group interacts with other groups. Subsequently, 
behavioral definition simply proposes that among ethnic groups there are cultural 
distinctions, however, the significant differences can only be seen when the 
interaction among ethnic groups occurs (Brass, 1991). 
Among the three approaches, Brass (1991) believed the most suitable 
definition for ethnic groups is the objective cultural markers. Every ethnic group is 
different from other ethnic groups in terms of objective cultural standards and 
contains within membership, either in principle or in practice, the component for 
complete allocation of work and for propagation forms an ethnic classification. 
Cultural markers are designed to highlight the cultural foundation of the ethnicity 
and to differentiate the ethnic classification from other kinds of social 
classifications. The genuine cultural markers might be language or dialect, unique 
outfit, food, customs, belief or race. 
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Ethnicity is a substitute shape of social organization and identification to 
class, but it is a flexible status that can change and is not rigid. Ethnic groups utilize 
ethnicity in order to compose demands in political sphere for revision of their status 
(whether in economic welfare, civil rights, or in educational opportunities) which 
manifest in a form of interest group‟s politics. However, some ethnic groups desire 
and demand communal rights to be granted to the group as a whole, what they desire 
for instance, not only have similar educational opportunities with other ethnic 
groups but also the demand to be given control over public education system in the 
areas that have significant numbers of their group members. Thus, they have the 
control and the ability to teach the history, language, customs, and culture of their 
group to their offspring (Brass, 1991). 
However, it must be noted that sometimes misperception happens when 
scholars try to utilize terms of “ethnicity” and “ethnic identity”. Wu (2007) 
explained, “Ethnicity is a set of characteristics commonly shared by individual 
constituents of a group” (ibid, p.9) also known as authentic racial-biological. 
However, although they share ethnic traits, it does not necessarily make this group 
ethnically united especially in terms of their actions. This explains that ethnicity 
does not instantly make the individuals associate themselves with their ethnic group. 
In contrast, ethnic identity immediately defines group solidarity with a chance 
followed by ethnic collective action. Consequently, while ethnicity contains 
cultural-historical traits, ethnic identity consists of moral awareness that permits 
ethnically distinct individuals to regard themselves as a united group (Wu, 2007). 
Furthermore, Wu stated that ethnic identity might originated “from racial-
biological and/or cultural traits obtained at birth” (ibid, p.11) of ethnicity, however, 
ethnicity is not a prerequisite for ethnic identity. Wu made an example from a 
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Chinese born in America may identify himself as American not as Chinese, his 
racial inherent characteristics as a Chinese person that he inherits by birth does not 
automatically define his “subjective identification” with the Chinese community, let 
alone his solidarity with it. In contrast, ethnic group solidarity could emerge based 
on its members‟ self-awareness and self-imagination of their ethnicity also known as 
“imagined ethnic group.” (Wu, 2007) 
1.1.3. Understanding the Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization 
The mainstream study of nationalist mobilization claims that the existence of 
ethnic-based institution which repeatedly creates ethnic cleavages over time is the 
reason for ongoing process of deeply divided societies. These are the reasons for the 
establishment of the ethnic-based political parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) found 
that political institutions are able to create cleavages which influence many political 
scholars. However, Mann (2004 as cited in, Kaufmann & Conversi, 2008) argued 
that it is too simplistic if we assumed the existence of elites from the ethnic-based 
institution or political parties automatically trigger mass mobilization. We need to 
understand the functions and implications of the ethnic-based association and 
patriotic societies‟ existence. 
Kaufmann and Conversi (2008, p.26) found that patriotic societies were 
necessary for the nationalism process in the “revolutionary France (i.e. Republican 
clubs), Switzerland (i.e. the Helvetic society) and elsewhere in Europe.” While, 
cultural associations aided “spread the ideas of romantic intellectuals and generate 
the impetus for the nationalist movements within the European empires in the 
nineteenth century.” 
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However, the reasons why social movements‟ mobilizations succeed or fail 
are still rarely studied and identified. For example, why the Sinn Fein‟s efforts in 
1914 to rally support for Irish nationalism failed so pathetically but then thrived two 
years later and why in 1974, The Orange Order in Northern Ireland succeed to help 
Protestant arrange protest toward Catholic supremacy but fail miserably during the 
early 1990s (Kaufmann, 2007). Githens-Mazer (2006) argued that the Sinn Fein‟s 
situation happened because of the importance of the “cultural trigger point”, an 
incident which occurs in a symbolically-charged situation thus leads to a step-
change in support for nationalist organizations. While, Kaufmann (2007) explained 
that the Orange Order movements succeeded due to the social magnetisms of the 
local Orange parades, lodge gatherings and family ties despite its members being 
severely divided over political and class issues but is still able to maintain its unity. 
Another example is in the Basque region where its people have ideological 
contrasts, cultural differences, and political pluralism but all these issues became 
null through the boundary-building effect of the violence and the existence of 
influential nationalist symbols in the street (Conversi, 1997). 
As a conclusion, mobilization by ethnic nationalists can happen even in a 
fragmented ethnic community as long the elites are able to obtain or create a cultural 
trigger point which can draw ethnic sentiments from the community and maximize it 
to trigger social magnetisms which lead to social mobilization. However, when the 
elites fail to maximize the effect of cultural trigger point, misuse it, or even 
misinterpret particular situations as a cultural trigger point then social mobilization 
might fail to materialize or even harm the nationalists.  
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1.1.4. The Southeast Asian Nationalism Situations 
 In Thailand, the state is promoting assimilation and integration approaches to 
its minorities. There are two prominent minorities who are considered as not 
originated from Thailand; the Chinese and the Malays. In the earlier period, Thai 
state was still very rigid and undemocratic; the Government forcefully implemented 
assimilation and integration policies. The assimilation process of Chinese 
community in Thailand was not as intense as Malays from the southern Thailand 
(Noiwong, 2001). 
Chinese community can easily assimilate into ingenuous community due to 
its education process and similarity in terms of religious belief (majority of both 
groups are Buddhists). Thai schools play an important role in the “re-socialization” 
of the Chinese students by disregarding Chinese culture and language, and 
introducing Thai cultures as role models for the Chinese. The government is 
promoting reward and punishment system based on Thai cultures to be implemented 
and practiced at home and also encourages the Chinese students to change their 
names into Thai-sounding name. Most importantly, completing Thai education is a 
prerequisite to obtain full citizenship rights (Guskin, 1966, as cited in Sachakul, 
1984). 
Chinese descents who have decided to become specialists, academicians and 
civil servants of their host country generally have to disintegrate from their 
primordial attachment in order to be accepted in the Thai society and to further 
integrate themselves into the Thai society. Therefore, large numbers of Chinese 
Thais gradually integrate into Thailand society. Although it does not mean Chinese 
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Thais were willing to assimilate completely (Coughlin, 1953; Skinner 1957, as cited 
in Sachakul, 1984). 
However, the Malays were not as docile as the Chinese. Malay Thais 
consider the Thai government as an authoritarian state who continuously disregard 
Malays Thais‟ religion, culture and social life. Any attempt by the Malay Thais to 
secure their religious belief and language was alleged by the Thai authority as an act 
of separatism (Noiwong, 2001). The Thai state attempted to exclude Malay Thais 
from Thailand‟s political process which led to violence by Malay extremists in order 
to become an independent society. In addition, there are two types of movement 
performed by the Malays: the one who resorts to violent approaches such as 
kidnapping, extorting, terrorizing, and assassinating the opposition of their cause 
(Pitsuawan, 1985) and the other who resorts to peaceful approach such as giving 
seminar to Thai civil servants, through their writings and public comments about 
relationship between Indigenous Thais and Malay Thais (Parekh, 1999). 
The Malay Thais who resort to violence usually are the Malay Muslim 
extremists, which is in its development their movements are gradually declining 
especially since Malaysia helps Thailand to capture these extremists. In addition, 
many Malay Thais do not sympathize with the extremists cause because most of 
them have become bandits attacking and pillaging villages (Wanchai, 1999 as cited 
in Noiwong, 2001). Malay Thais who resort to peaceful approach usually are the 
academicians and professionals who support liberal or moderate Islam (Bhikhu, 
1999; Noiwong, 2001), for instance, Ismail (1996, as cited in Noiwong, 2001) 
proposed that Muslims and Buddhists should work together despite their differences. 
Noiwong (2001) argued that Malay Thais who choose peaceful approach are more 
successful in making Thailand‟s authority accept Malay Thais and give the Malays a 
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political share in the Southern Thailand province. Many Malay Thais gradually 
abandon their desire to create independent regions in Thailand. 
In Singapore, the development of nationalism is rather unique. Chinese 
descents are the majority population in Singapore followed by Malay descents and 
the Indian descents.
1
 Despite the fact Chinese Singaporeans are the majority, earlier 
in its independence, Chinese Singaporean leaders suggested multicultural policy 
instead of minorities‟ assimilation policy (Quah, 2000). This happens due to the 
number of Singapore‟s population is relatively small if compared to other countries 
in the Southeast Asia except for Brunei, thus its ability to regenerate talented 
citizens is relatively slow (Lee, 1989). 
Moreover, different from other countries in the Southeast Asia, Singaporeans 
did not originate from the Singapore Island but immigrants who settled in this island 
(Lee, 1989). That is why Singaporeans‟ primordial sense are not as strong as its 
neighboring countries, and some Singaporeans even have stronger attachment with 
their home countries instead of Singapore (Quah, 2000). Furthermore, the standard 
of living in Singapore is relatively high since this country does not have any natural 
resources thus there is a trend by Singaporeans to migrate to other countries when 
they have the opportunity to do so. These are a sign of frail loyalty to the nation. 
Due to these circumstances, Singaporean elites decide to maintain multicultural 
instead of assimilate the minorities, not to mention several racial riots occurred 
during the early years of its independence (Quah, 1985, 2000). 
In order to promote nation-building, Singaporean nationalists promote the 
usage of English language for communication with different races while at the same 
                                                 
1
 The Information was taken from Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999, 
p.34-38. 
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time still maintaining their mother tongue to prevent discontent from minorities and 
preventing the Chinese-educated Chinese (opposition) from assuming the leadership 
role (Vasil, 1995). Later on, this condition creates a gap between the English-
educated Chinese and the Chinese-educated Chinese. Despite its small population, 
Singapore‟s minorities are given a certain number of seats in parliament to prevent 
discontent which might lead to disintegration (Vasil, 1995).  
The government also introduces NS (National Service), a conscription policy 
that is claimed able to promote nation-building. Singaporean nationalists argued that 
this training will create a bonding sentiment among Singaporeans since the male 
Singaporean youths experience it together. This situation implied that Singaporean 
elites are desperate to maintain the loyalty of minorities (Quah, 1990, The Strait 
Times, 1990). 
However, the second generation of Singaporean nationalists starts to reveal 
their ethno-nationalist desire by promoting “speak Mandarin” campaign also known 
as “Asianizing Singapore” (Vasil, 1995). Although this campaign was meant for the 
Chinese but the non-Chinese Singaporeans (Malays, Indians, and Eurasian) begin to 
feel threatened and alienated by this campaign (Quah, 1990 & 2000). This campaign 
which lasted for more than two decades made the minorities felt insecure and 
established a sense of the racial consciousness (Quah, 1990). Chinese nationalists 
claimed the Singaporeans need to restore their cultures and heritages so they can 
function effectively in their communities and the western world. Chinese 
nationalists believed that the English-educated Chinese should speak Mandarin 
because if Chinese Singaporeans did not restore their Chinese-ness then the country 
will lose its highly educated and skilled citizens, thus it will affect its political 
stability (Goh, 1999). Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong claimed it as the overlapping 
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circles approach, where each ethnic group in Singapore is preserving their ethnic 
identity but at the same time still united as proud citizens of Singapore (Goh, 1999).  
In its progress, many Singaporeans migrate to western countries (Quah, 
2000). IPS (Institute Policies Study) found that many ex-Singaporeans were not 
satisfied with the quality of education for their children in Singapore because it is 
too pressurizing and lack in developing creative thinking; besides, the Singaporean 
government is regimented, imbalanced, and intolerant. Moreover, they believed the 
work in Singapore is too stressful compared to western countries they migrated to 
(Yap, 1991). 
However, the biggest nationalism issue in Singapore is coming from PR 
(permanent resident) holders. The PR holder obtained similar benefits and privileges 
as the Singaporean, minus an ability to vote (Cunha, 1999). This condition makes 
Singaporeans question the value of their citizenships and reluctant to fulfill the NS 
obligation. The gap between Singaporeans and PR holders are widening when more 
number of occupations in Singapore were taken by the PR holders which lead to 
unemployment among Singaporeans. Moreover, Singaporeans sense that their 
government “cares” for the PR holders too much. However, at the same time, 
Singaporeans did not realize the Singapore‟s government predicament. The 
government needs foreigners‟ workforce to fill vacancy in its economy pillar or 
other vacant occupations that cannot be filled by Singaporeans. As a conclusion, 
Singaporeans‟ nationalism sentiments are eroded by state actions which might lead 
to exodus by the Singaporeans, due to their assumption that the Singaporean 
government does not value its citizens‟ rights (Quah, 2000).  
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While in Malaysia, the rise of Malaysian nationalism is complicated. It is not 
simply struggle between Malay nationalists and non-Malay nationalists, but also 
between conservatives and radical nationalists within one ethnic group (Salleh, 
2000). On the surface, Malays dominance is being challenged by non-Malays such 
as Chinese Malaysian nationalists. However, in reality non-Malays have problems 
among themselves such as internal splits within one community, inter-ethnic elites‟ 
alliance, and economic growth have weakened the non-Malays position to place a 
strong demand towards the Malays. Due to these circumstances, Malay nationalists, 
through their prominent political party UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization) should be able to exert their power and authority to define “Malaysian 
Nationality” in terms of Malay culture, welfares and religion (Islam). 
However, Malay nationalists are not a homogenous group as most outsiders 
might think. In general, it contains conservatives English-educated elites and radical 
Malay-educated nationalists. This difference is manifested in UMNO and PAS (Parti 
Islam SeMalaysia). UMNO wants a more secular nation while PAS desires pure 
Islamic nation (Funston, 1980). Surprisingly, this situation cannot be used by 
Chinese Malaysian nationalists, due to the fact that the Chinese community are busy 
taking care of friction between “young Turks” (representing the younger generation 
who demand greater Chinese culture rights and questioning “old guard” 
accommodation of accepting Malays special position) and “old guard” (older 
generation who sided with UMNO) inside the MCA (Malaysian Chinese 
Association) and also to fend off radical Chinese from DAP (Democratic Action 
Party) waves (Loh, 1982; Salleh, 2000). 
As a result, inter-ethnic alliance was not inevitable. In order to secure 
legitimation as an incumbent ruler of Malaysia, Malays (UMNO) made alliance with 
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non-Malays who share similar goals and forms a coalition known as BN (Barisan 
Nasional) (Loh, 2002; Salleh, 2000). On the other hand, the radical Malay 
nationalists (PAS) also make inter-ethnic alliance with the radical and/or the 
opposition non-Malays and create a coalition known as Pakatan Rakyat. When 
globalization enters Malaysia, it brings daunting tasks for incumbent elite leaders. 
UMNO elites try to realign their objectives to become economic orientated and 
cultivate the culture of aggressive wealth accumulation (Salleh, 2000). 
Globalization gives implication on several Malay pillars. Liberalization of 
education system is encouraging the usage of English language as secondary 
language, which has made Malay nationalists felt betrayed by UMNO. UMNO is 
trying to introduce Malaysian consciousness (known as National Pride) as a 
substitute to Malay nationalism. However, it only gives superficial implication due 
to lack of support from fundamental elements such as religion, language, education 
and sharing similar traits. As a result, regardless of the Malaysianization effort done 
by government, ethnic gaps still thrive in everyday life. Currently, inter-ethnic 
alliance is considered as a viable option by elite nationalists to secure legitimacy in 
Malaysia (Salleh, 2000). 
 As a conclusion, based on these three Southeast Asian countries, the author 
drew several conclusions. State (government) and majority‟s behavior and action 
can determine how the minorities will react towards it. The stronger state/majorities 
put a pressure onto minorities, the weaker minorities‟ willingness to assimilate or 
integrate with the majorities. Moreover, when a state is unable to create a bond 
among ethnic groups within one nation, disintegration will most likely happen. 
However, when a state is unable to make its citizens acquire a sense of belonging to 
its nation then the loyalty of its citizens will deteriorate thus leading to ethnic 
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nationalist‟s movements. Furthermore, within-one-community dispute might take 
place which is why generalizing one ethnic group as a united group might lead to 
misconception or misinterpretation. There is a time when intra-ethnic relationship is 
worsening which encourages one fragment of group to ally themselves with other 
groups that share similar objective(s) in order to survive. 
1.1.5. The Indonesia’s Situation 
Nationalism development in Indonesia after Suharto resignation is at a grim 
situation. The transition from civic into ethnic nationalism and inconsistency from 
political elites which created opposing groups (a faction who desires freedom of 
speech and identity revival in the name of democracy against a faction who desires 
to maintain status quo by preserving civic nationalism of the Suharto‟s version) have 
led Indonesia into political turmoil. These political elites wish to gain public support 
of Indonesians society while promoting contradicting objectives have torn 
Indonesia‟s legitimacy apart. Moreover, post-Suharto integration principle is 
different compared to Suharto‟s regime. Reformed regime proposes the theme of 
living in harmony within a plural society that can be achieved through the discourse 
of democracy and human right, which is completely the opposite of Suharto‟s force 
assimilation program. 
On top of that, civic education (a government tool for proposing nationalism 
principle in form of integration) proposes that religious and ethnic clash should be 
solved through the practice of mutual respect among societal groups. It also explains 
that mutual respect requires positive acknowledgement of other religions or beliefs 
(Tim ICCE UIN, 2003 as cited in Song, 2008). The civic education has inspired the 
revival of the ethnic-based organizations and religious organizations. 
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However, during post-Suharto era there are two major issues that 
materialized. Firstly, the implementation of civic education and democratization 
during the post-Suharto backfire its original purpose. Instead of creating harmony 
among different ethnics and religious groups, it develops into ethnics and religious 
polarization focused on radical agendas by certain fanatic groups in ways to achieve 
identity exclusiveness. Secondly, the widening gap between the poor and the rich 
due to globalization (since this study only focused on ethno-nationalist study, the 
issue of social justice such as relationship between the poor and the rich will not be 
discussed). However, globalization has a role which influences the development of 
ethnic nationalists; it promotes “politics of identity” to achieve “purity” of ethnic or 
religion. Instead of established understanding from different ethnics or religions, the 
exclusiveness of each group has made Indonesia becomes further fragmented and it 
gives birth to a strong ethno-nationalist‟s sentiment that occur not only in the 
national level but also in the regional level (Song, 2008). 
The fragmentation in Indonesia has started since Suharto regime but it is 
getting intense when Indonesia enters the post-Suharto era. Pudjiastuti (2002) stated 
that Suharto regime which promoted homogeneity culture instead of pluralism 
contributed to latent discontent among ethnic groups in Indonesia but they are too 
afraid to react, especially the relationship between the Javanese and non-Javanese. 
However, since Suharto regime fell and in the event of the lack of strong political 
leaders have made ethnic and religion frictions easier to materialize. For instance, in 
Kupang, hostility happens in response to events of church burnings in Java. 
Therefore, Christian mobs attacked Muslims properties, although this condition did 
not last long. However, in a few days after Kupang‟s incident, religious outbreaks 
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occur in Ambon and the Central Moluccas and it spread to other areas including 
Poso in Sulawesi (Lundry, 2009). 
Minorities‟ discontent, frustration and the government inability to solve these 
issues play important role in encouraging disintegration which occurs across the 
Indonesian archipelago. The separatist‟s movements are getting intense. Regions 
such Aceh, Ambon and West Papua demand for separation and independence from 
Indonesia. Similar case happens to East Timor region; however, unlike Aceh, 
Ambon and West Papua cases, the East Timor separation and independence was 
granted (Lundry, 2009). Discontent from minorities towards the government due to 
the lack of equality in terms of the economy, political representation and culture 
(sometimes also including religion issues) would lead to separatism. Separatist 
movements are the indication of malfunction state in the process of establishment of 
nationalism and state building in plural societies (Tow, 2001). 
Ultimately, this fragmentation in the form of ethno-nationalism not only 
affected indigenous ethnic groups but also the naturalization of ethnic groups such 
as the Chinese community. It is widely known during Suharto regime if not all, most 
Chinese communities were apolitical. However, when Suharto regime fell many 
Chinese suddenly became interested in political issues, courtesy to democratization 
and civic education policy, some of them established political parties and NGOs 
such as PARTI (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia), PBI (Partai Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika), Parpindo (Partai Pembauran Indonesia, later transformed into an 
ordinary association), SNB (Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa), Formasi, Gandi (Gerakan 
Anti-Diskriminasi), PSMTI (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia), INTI 
(Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa), SIMPATIK (Solidaritas Pemuda-Pemudi 
Tionghoa Indonesia untuk Keadilan), HMTI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Tionghoa 
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Indonesia), PWBI (Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia), and many more (Suryadinata, 
2004; Hoon, 2006; Setiono, 2007; Thung; 2009). Many founding fathers of these 
NGOs and political parties claimed the main reason behind the establishment of 
their organizations is due to their responsibility as members of the Indonesian 
society and their role in trying to eradicate discriminatory policies against the 
Chinese community (Suryadinata, 2004). However, many NGOs still claimed to be 
apolitical organizations. Lembong (2004) argued that this does not discourage 
political desire either by those NGOs or its members. There is a tendency of Chinese 
elites who enter the political sphere who promise to eradicate discriminatory policies 
as if when they are in charge, the discrimination in Indonesia will suddenly vanish. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
The traditional ideal concept of modern political unit is a state that integrates 
under a single national community known as nation-state; however, nowadays this 
situation is very difficult to achieve (Horowitz, 1985). Heterogeneous states are 
considered as unstable and unnatural to achieve harmony. Therefore, social 
cleavages must be eradicated and assimilation of minority group was the only sine 
qua non of political stability (Coleman & Rosberg, 1966, as cited in Noiwong, 
2001). On contrary, Lijphart (1971, p.11) stated, “Political stability can be 
maintained in culturally fragmented systems, if the leaders of subcultures engage in 
cooperative efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural 
fragmentation”. This means all elites from major social groups are delighted to 
maintain ethnic groups‟ stability if they were given chance to do so. 
Theoretically this concept gives legitimacy to parochial loyalties but it also 
needs an overlaying ideological national consensus. A national political culture, or 
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known as “moderate nationalism”, is created when a nation gives each major social 
group a portion of nation‟s legitimacy to maintain social and political stabilities 
(Lijphart, 1971 as cited in Noiwong, 2001). Therefore, political stability can be 
achieved in multiethnic nation as long as its minorities are given opportunities to 
participate in decision making process. In the era of globalization, it is virtually 
impossible to have a homogenous ethnic group in one country. 
In Indonesia‟s framework, after Suharto‟s authoritarian regime finally ended 
in 1998, the government has a daunting task to maintain political stability while at 
the same time needs to prevent disintegration orchestrated by discontent regions and 
minority groups. It triggers social and political turmoil which had shaken the very 
foundation of Indonesian society. Monetary crisis has made Indonesian economy at 
its lowest state but 1998‟s outbreak was a serious blow to Indonesia‟s integrity and 
ability to handle problem. However, Indonesian leaders attempt to save Indonesia 
from its deathbed by reforming Indonesia‟s bureaucracy and political system which 
is known as the Reform era. In addition, transition from authoritarian state into 
democratic state does not necessarily save Indonesia from breakdown but it does 
give a glimpse of hope to Indonesia‟s future; the Reform government decides to 
replace Suharto‟s monoculturalism project with multiculturalism concept.  
The inability to adapt with immediate transition and failure to define 
democracy properly would prevent Indonesia from recovery especially when 
Indonesians defined free speech as unconditional liberty or plural society as 
exclusive groups. Moreover, regime transition does not directly wipe away 
Indonesia‟s disintegration issues. In fact, post-Suharto regime faces grave 
disintegration issues that lean toward radical movements such as Timor Leste 
departures from Indonesia and become independent nation, uprising in Aceh by 
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GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), Papua‟s uprising, “religious” violence in eastern 
Maluku islands and Poso (Central Sulawesi). (Pudjiastuti, 2002) 
Additionally, the fact that Indonesia has more than 300 different ethnic 
groups in which most of them were being suppressed by Suharto has made the 
implementation of multiculturalism model an impractical goal (Suryadinata, 2003). 
On top of that, realizing that there is an opportunity to resurrect their cultural 
heritage makes Indonesians‟ primordial spirit burn even stronger than before. 
Moreover, civic education as a symbol of government support toward unity in 
diversity concept has backfired against them. Civic education concepts allow ethnic 
groups especially minorities to promote their cultures without the fear of being 
blamed for cause of disintegration. 
The implementation of autonomy regions policy has weakened Indonesians‟ 
solidarity thus the term Indonesian citizens just becomes rhetoric. Many regions 
instead of promoting unity in diversity concept, ethnic clashes between majorities 
and minorities are getting intense; region becomes a small kingdom of ethnic 
majority of that particular area. Indonesia‟s ideology (Pancasila) is nothing more 
than a symbol whereas ethno-nationalism principle has gradually taken people‟s 
heart and mind. Zakaria (1997) argued usually a nation that undergoes transition into 
democratic nation tends to give vent to hyper-nationalism which leads to ethnic 
clashes. Instead of delivering freedom, prosperity, and liberty, premature democracy 
has tendency to reverse. Brown (2000) stated the discrepancy between performance 
and promise by elites tends to create disappointment and uncover the tension 
between two visions of the nationalism (civic and ethno-cultural) that leads to open 
conflict, whereas ethnic minorities deem they are cheated and marginalized by civic 
nationalism and decided to turn to ethno-nationalism instead. 
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The waves of ethno-nationalist‟s movements do not only influence 
local/indigenous ethnic groups but also the naturalization of ethnic groups in 
Indonesia such as the Chinese community. Several members‟ of Chinese community 
have the initiative for constructing ethnic-based organizations and ethnic-based 
political parties whereby their objectives are to resurrect Chinese cultures and 
political might to its former glory. However, there is no evident study that defines 
the ultimate reasons why the Chinese nationalist emerges, thus this issue needs to be 
investigated in order to understand their motives and objectives. Although some of 
these NGOs and political parties claimed the establishment of their organizations did 
not symbolize the exclusiveness of Chinese community but their support towards the 
struggle of Chinese community equality in Indonesia is questionable.  
Moreover, Suryadinata (2004) argued that although the Chinese community 
appears cohesive, disagreement is still clearly evident due to different agenda and 
political alignments by different groups of people. These Chinese elites utilized 
Chinese Indonesians‟ traumatic experience as an instrument to achieve their goals. 
For instance, Chinese nationalists promise if they get elected or secured a position 
then in return they will give benefits towards their members (eradicating 
discriminatory policies, ensuring better life, promoting equality, etc.). Although, 
these attempts do not necessarily make Chinese community supports Chinese 
nationalists‟ endeavor especially many of them are still anxious to participate 
directly in politics but this attempt shows that Chinese are not as apolitical as people 
think. Through time, the number of Chinese-based organizations has increased 
steadily (Suryadinata, 2008). Since not all Chinese-based organizations can be 
defined as part of ethno-nationalist revival, thus the investigations of which 
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organizations can be defined as part of Chinese ethno-nationalist‟s movements are 
really important. 
In conclusion, the rise of ethno-nationalism in Indonesia has influenced the 
Chinese community perspective (at least some of them). Their desire to carry out 
their ethnic interests in a form of organizations, NGOs, and political parties at 
national level (or regional level) has proven that the Chinese community does not 
isolate themselves only in economy sector. Chinese elites and nationalists‟ attempt 
to eradicate discriminatory policies and participate directly in politics are other faces 
of the Chinese community that were never seen during the Suharto era. This 
puzzling situation raises the following questions: what makes the Chinese 
community suddenly embraces ethno-nationalism principle and follows its trend? 
Are Chinese Indonesians already fed up with their condition and plan to participate 
directly in politics instead of delegating their aspirations to someone else? Most 
importantly, how strong is the implication of Chinese nationalist sentiment toward 
the Indonesian politics? 
1.3. Research Questions 
This study will focus on four research questions. 
1. In what way does Chinese community in Indonesia during post-Suharto 
define ethno-nationalism in its movements? 
2. What are the reasons for Chinese community to follow ethno-nationalist 
trend? 
3. How does Chinese ethno-nationalist develop within the Chinese community? 
4. What are the Chinese ethno-nationalist sentiments effects towards 
Indonesia‟s politics? 
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1.4. Research Objectives 
In general, this study aims at understanding the development of ethno-
nationalism by Chinese community in Indonesia during the post-Suharto regime. In 
specific, this study focuses on four main objectives. 
1. To comprehend Chinese community‟s perspectives regarding ethno-
nationalism concept. 
2. To understand the reasons Chinese community follows ethno-nationalist 
trend. 
3. To study the progress of Chinese ethno-nationalist movements inside 
Chinese community. 
4. To determine the effect Chinese ethno-nationalist sentiments have influenced 
the fabric of Indonesia‟s politics. 
1.5. Scope of Study 
 This study focuses on post-Suharto era, however, the nationalism study has 
the tendency of biasness if the author‟s data source solely from Post-Suharto and 
thus to certain degree the author also utilizes the data from Suharto and pre-Suharto 
era. Post-Suharto era starts from year 1998 and until present time is still considered 
as post-Suharto era (also known as Reform era). Moreover, this study also focuses 
on Chinese Indonesians who support the revival of ethno-nationalism notion 
regardless of their individual unique background. In addition, the author also 
includes studies of Pribumi (Indonesians indigenous) to explain the relationship and 
interaction between the Pribumi and the Chinese Indonesians to give better insight 
on Chinese Indonesians‟ motives. 
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Furthermore, Chinese Indonesians are heterogeneous community and many 
of them have integrated (to a certain degree) to their respective area which makes 
Chinese Indonesians who settled in every region become unique. Consequently, to 
overcome the heterogeneity of Chinese Indonesians issues, the author decides to 
focus on Chinese-based organizations instead. Chinese-based organizations with 
national coverage have the tendency to be centralized despite having branches in 
many regions; usually these branches are interconnected to each other and 
dependent on their headquarters. Therefore, Chinese-based organizations are 
suitable and reasonable for this study. 
1.6. Significance of Study  
 The study of nationalism is not considered as a contemporary study, yet it 
keeps evolving from time to time following dynamic changes of societies and states. 
Moreover, previous studies concerning the Chinese community in Indonesia either 
by foreign or local researchers were mainly concentrated on economic study, 
marginalization, or discriminatory issues. Consequently, studies concerning Chinese 
ethno-nationalists in Indonesia are limited especially in the political outlook. That is 
why this study is important due to following reasons: 
 This study will help to provide different perspectives of the Chinese 
Indonesians‟ political and social awareness from what mostly other scholars 
had done. 
 This study will help to give a better picture of the development and 
implication of Chinese ethno-nationalist‟s movements in Indonesia by using 
the Chinese-based organizations‟ standpoints. 
